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INTRODUCTION
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has become one of the most important phenomena in international business (IB) as part of the rising globalization. Meanwhile, the world also witnesses an upsurge of nationalism across countries, which has emerged as one of the main issues confronting the world (Balabanis, Diamantopoulos, Mueller, & Melewar, 2001 ). These two forces are intertwined:
nationalistic sentiments grow as a reaction to the instabilities/benefits created by globalization, and economic nationalism greatly impacts foreign firms' market entry and operations. Inbound 3 acquisitions are not free from the growing influence of economic nationalism of host countries as exemplified by recent cases. In 2005 the state-owned CNOOC's bid for Unocal as part of the China Goes Global policy was vetoed by the USA Congress due to national security concerns. In 2007 SEB, a France-based corporation, who bid for Super, China's largest manufacture of small appliances, saw severe oppositions from rivals in a fear of market monopoly when receiving approval by Chinese central government.
Despite perceived importance (e.g., Dunning, 1998; , the influence of economic nationalism on inbound M&A has received little empirical attention. Past acquisition success studies that build on the resource-based view (RBV) and transaction cost analysis (TCA) largely focus on the features of the deals and the entrants, their resources and capabilities in particular, that enable them to reduce costs and achieve sustainable competitive advantage (Anand & Delios, 2002; Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) . Recent development suggests that a firm's international expansion is also enabled and constrained by the different institutions under which it operates (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss & Zheng, 2007; Hoskisson, Eden & Wright, 2000; Meyer & Peng, 2005; Mudambi & Navarra, 2002; Peng, 2002 Peng, & 2003 Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson & Peng, 2005; Peng, Wang & Jiang 2008) . In this line a few studies have examined the impact of institutions on cross-border acquisition, such as industrial regulatory factors (Muehlfeld, Sahib, & Witteloostuijn, 2007) , institutional quality of hosts (Zhang, Zhou & Ebbers, 2011) , and institutional distance (Dikova, Sahib & Witteloostuijn, 2010) .
Despite this advancement, one of the key institutional factors, economic nationalism as an important antecedent to cross-border acquisition (in)completion remains under-researched in political science and economics (Baughn & Yaprak, 1996) and IB literatures. In the former, "the concept of economic nationalism is relatively unexplored, and seems to fall in the interstices between separate disciplinary interests and concerns" (Burnell, 1986: 16) . Economic nationalism and its impact have not been adequately examined by economic theory as well (Pickel, 2002) .
In IB studies, the traditional OLI paradigm tends to focus on how national/regional characteristics determine MNEs' location choice to access or exploit their O-specific advantages (Dunning, 1998; , including the host's institutions (Cantwell, Dunning & Lundan, 2010) such as the nationalistic policies (Dunning, 2009) . OLI wisdom stresses the international value-chain allocation, for example 4 the MNEs' preference for less protectionist locations even when they process the institutional ownership advantages (Cantwell, Dunning & Lundan, 2010) . This paper has a different angle by drawing on institutional theory and focusing on the likelihood to complete the intended M&A when the FDI location has been chosen. This approach and empirical work therefore add to OLI wisdom because they provide measured effects by a set of very important institutions upon the possibility of inward FDI in the form of M&A to have successful completion. The favorable institutions including nationalistic attitudes towards foreign investments as revealed in our empirical work could be counted as one of the locational factors.
Many writers for practical journals have noted that foreign investors have to take nationalism in host countries seriously when entering and operating in these areas such as China 1 (e.g., Economy & Lieberthal, 2007; Paine, 2010; Vanhonacker, 1997) . Although it is a common sense that nationalism impacts FDI, but the literature fails to see an empirical study concerning the extent to which it affects the completion of inbound M&As. As UNCTAD's World Investment Report 2011 notes, although liberalizing investment policy measures taken globally in 2010 outnumbered restrictive measures, however "(w)ithout the benefit of statistics, investors might have drawn the opposite conclusion, witnessing what appears to be a rising tide of national resistance to foreign takeovers" (see Walker, 2012 in Columbia FDI Perspectives) . Thus an investigation into the precise impact of economic nationalism is timely.
Besides, economic nationalism as a crucial institutional factor may do better than the over simplified dichotomy of liberalism and protectionism in explaining business activities and performance from a broader sense, given that it may take either perspectives depending on the then national interests and conditions (Helleiner, 2002; Peng, Wang & Jiang, 2008) .
Economic nationalism is an important issue that MNEs need to address when expanding into a foreign market and seeking to gain legitimacy (Cantwell, Dunning & Lundan, 2010; Hanon, 1996; Zaheer, 1995) . Foreign invested companies, compared with indigenous entities, are expected to be more prone to and amenable to pursuing firm-specific, rather than national economic interests, which do not 1 We thank one of the reviewer for bringing Dunning's and other practical work to our attention.
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always align with the host's national interests (Kim, 2007) . Foreign investors may be perceived as having different philosophies regarding sustainability, labor, and industrial policies, which may conflict the public goals favored by the host. A host government develops and employs formal institutions such as industrial policies, technology boost policies, FDI policies and foreign policies to ensure the national interests. Firms that attempt to defy these institutional factors risk losing legitimacy and, hence, failure in that market (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007 questions provides a number of contributions to the literature. First, it expands the institutional theory by indicating the important but under-researched and dynamic role played by economic nationalism in FDI arena. It also adds to the OLI paradigm by providing the empirical study of a set of specific institutions that will impact MNEs' locational choice. Second, it adds new insights to FDI research by providing measured extent to which economic nationalism dynamically influences inbound M&A completion. Third, it is also beneficial to MNEs by bringing them cautions of the influential economic nationalism that may substantially increase liability of foreignness and costs (Zaheer, 1995) .
In line with the call that IB study should be interdisciplinary (Cantwell & Brannen; 2011) , we draw on both IB and political science literature (e.g. Baughn & Yaprak, 1996; Johnson, 1965 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS
Economic nationalism has been widely misinterpreted as an ideology associated with 'protectionism' fending off foreign MNEs (in favor of domestic ownership) in areas like political economy (Baughn & Yaprak, 1996; Dicken, 2007; Helleiner, 2002) and IB (i.e., Buckley & Ghauri, 2004) , and with nationalistic sentiments and ethnocentricity in marketing (e.g., Balabanis, Diamantopoulos, Mueller & Melewar, 2001 ). However, there are contrasting differences between these two terms. Economic nationalism is a dynamic concept. The natural of economic nationalism is to ensure a nation's economic development and sovereignty (Gilpin, 1987) . Its definition "must be modified from one of protecting domestic capital from foreign capital to leveraging local resources for extracting economic benefits from the global economy" (D'Costa, 2009: 622) . Many nationalist goals such as the promotion of the national unity, identity and autonomy are pursued through a variety of economic policies that often include free trade and investment in light of economic liberalism ( D'Costa, 2009; Helleiner, 2002; Pickel, 2002; Shulman, 2000) to help a country obtain "power, prestige, or prosperity" (Helleiner, 2002: 310) . Many New Industrial Economies and Emerging Economies have intervened on nationalist grounds to strategically exploit opportunities available in the global economy, contrasting to their past protectionist gestures (e.g. Amsden, 1989; Johnson, 1982; Gold, 1986; D'Costa, 2009) . Therefore protectionism and liberalism work together, which to dominate is contingent on what is perceived to be beneficial to the national interests in a particular time period.
Following Helleiner (2002) we define economic nationalism as a form of nationalistic ideology associated with various economic policies.
Economic nationalism is a crucial aspect of the home country's institutions (Beland & Lecours, 2005) , which can greatly facilitate or constrain foreign investors' FDI (Dikova, Sahib & Witteloostuijn, 2010) .
7 North (1990) defines institutions as the humanly devised constrains that structure human interaction, and include both informal (e.g. ideas, attitude) and formal forces (e.g., policies, regulations) (Zaheer, 1995) . Scott (1995) suggests that institutions consist of three pillars, regulative, normative and cognitive forces. These institutions are linked to both collective activities and governmental policies and individual behaviors (Balabanis, Diamantopoulos, Mueller & Melewar, 2001 (Dikova, Sahib & Witteloostuijn, 2010) .
A country's institutional environment influences the success of a foreign firm's cross-border acquisition because the environment reflects the "rules of the game" by which it enters and operates in a given market (Scott, 1995) . Economic nationalism is one of the key institutional factors that exert impacts on firms' FDI. However, existing economic nationalism studies largely treat nationalism as the explanatory problem (explanandum) while ignoring its explanatory function (explanans) (Pickel, 2002 (Pickel, & 2003 . As an effort to fill this knowledge gap, this research seeks to examine the explanatory power of economic nationalism on cross-border acquisition completion. We develop a conceptual model (Figure 1 ) based on political literatures and institutional theory (Abdelal, 2005; Baughn & Yaprak, 1996; Chen, 2005; Johnson, 1965; Ning, 2009; North, 1990; Pickel, 2002) .
As a subset of institutions, economic nationalism comprises two aspects: informal (ideology of nationalism) and formal constrains (policies, regulations). The political literature indicates that policies and regulations in light of nationalism largely follow the ideology, and both work to influence economic activities (Beland & Lecours, 2005; Johnson, 1965) . Our empirical analysis focuses on the effects of the policies derived from nationalistic ideology on inward acquisition completion.
As we have argued economic nationalism is unnecessarily related with protectionism in nature.
Pragmatic nationalism is national-interest driven. Its orientation to world affairs is seeking and defending national interests, particularly national security and territorial integration (Zhao, 2000) .
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Directed by this pragmatism, the ideology of economic nationalism possesses the elements of both protectionism and liberalism, which shape the national policy. For example, to achieve national prosperity, countries develop formal institutions such as competition policies to improve their comparative advantages by attracting FDI and/or engaging in international markets (Dunning, 2009 ).
We follow the concept of nationalizing mechanism by Pickel (2002) to gain a better understanding of how economic nationalism functions in influencing inward FDI. The nationalizing mechanism, which subsumes economic nationalism, is a crucial social process in current global transformations. With the state as the central actor, it looks to legitimate changing economic and political systems, and to facilitate their economic and political integration regionally and globally. Therefore a state's policy and actions reflect how it copes with internal legitimation and external integration in a collective way, since economic nationalism works as a set of policies that follow the national objectives and directions (Abdelal, 2005) . Following this logic, we conclude that the economic nationalism functions collectively through the domestic policy and foreign relations for the nation's economic development and security. Consequently, our empirical model focuses on three important aspects of economic nationalism, i.e. national security, foreign relations and national growth strategy. National security emphasizes a country's sovereignty including economic safety (Jiang, 2007) . Foreign relations, as outcomes of foreign policy to serve national interests by creating a safe environment for the nation, influence inbound FDI from nations that have diplomatic relations with the host (Chen, 2005; Ning, 2009 ). National growth strategy includes three key economic policies, i.e. industrial policy, technology policy, and FDI policy, all of which aim to enhance a country's economic prosperity. We suggest that all these three components have impacts on inbound M&A success.
To convert the conceptual model into an empirical model, we develop a set of testable hypotheses by using the case of China. A transitional economy and the largest FDI recipient (Peng, 2006 ), China's experience reflects the dynamic nature of economic nationalism and provides a perfect lab to examine how economic nationalism impacts inbound FDI completion. Since the late 1970s, China's economic nationalism has been shifted from simple and defensive protection of domestic businesses to greater international visibility. In Maoist anti-imperialist nationalism, foreign capitalists were clearly viewed as enemies, and "self-reliance" was watchword. After 1978, autarky was abandoned, and the economic 9 nationalism transformed from nativism to pragmatism (Zhao, 2000) . Chinese leaders recognize that China's economic advancement depends heavily on integration with the rest of the world. To achieve modernization, political leaders initiated a unique path of reform and openness to engage China in the world economy. China's economic nationalism was then partially reflected by some liberal actions like welcoming FDI, joining WTO, and encouraging domestic companies' outbound FDI (Crane, 1999) . In the transition, the integrative nationalism becomes a central element in China's external nationalizing mechanism (Pickel, 2002) 2 . China is very careful and takes a gradualist approach in its participation in the world economy. So China's openness is not without reservation; when an inbound acquisition concerns national security or national growth strategy, economic nationalism may arise. Certain government agencies play an important role in M&A control through enforcing laws and regulations, and reviewing and approving deals. The decision depends on the structure of the deal, the nature of the target and the industrial sector, and the value of the transaction.
National security considerations
An essential element of nationalism is the actions that a nation takes in seeking to achieve or sustain sovereignty (e.g. Gellner, 1983; Miller, 2000) . National security is the primary concern of a government. Serving the national interest, many governments use national security as the mandate to . In practice, although the foreign capital has aggressively participated in privatization of SOEs via M&A (Lin, 2008) , acquiring SOEs ends up with low success rate. On the contrary, the transaction for a private target is more likely to be determined by the market, based on the will of private sellers and buyers, and less complicated by the government and public opinion. 5 These arguments lead to the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2a. An acquisition of an SOE target is less likely to be completed than other targets. Hypothesis 2b. An acquisition of a private target is more likely to be completed than other targets.

Foreign relations
The nationalists identify a foreign country as threatening their national identity and security not only with its power, but also with how the two countries have interrelated politically and historically (Abdelal, 2005) . Nationalism is a fundamental force in influencing Chinese foreign policy (Zhu, 2001 ).
The fundamental goals of China's foreign policy include preserving its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, creating a favorable international environment for its reform and opening-up and economic exchanges than those of poor relations (Davis & Meunier, 2011 , Zhang, Witteloostuijn & Elhorst, 2011 . A good diplomatic relation, for example, friendly high-level visits from an investing country would improve the country's acknowledgment in China. We expect that an MNE from a country that has good foreign relations with China would find it easier to be recognized and accepted.
Therefore we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3: A cross-border acquisition is more likely to be completed if an acquirer is from a country with good foreign relation with China.
Growth strategy
An ideology of nationalism reflected in economic domain, China has adopted an 'opening' or liberalist policy as its long-term fundamental state policy since 1979 based on such a notion that China's economic development depends heavily on integration with the world economy. Generally China welcomes FDI as part of its economic ideology. an industry increases to a certain level, domestic concerns might grow fearing that foreign companies dominate the national market and thus threaten national economic security (Borgonjon & Sinclair, 2006 ). This may turn a liberalist FDI policy into a protectionist one. In recent years, many foreign M&A attempts target leading Chinese firms in sectors including beverage, cosmetics, electronics, automobiles, petrochemicals and machinery. These have aroused close attention of Chinese scholars and politicians, who are concerned that once foreign companies establish a monopoly in these industries, they will essentially manipulate Chinese market (Wang, 2007) . Protecting the industry from being controlled by foreign hands is a common reason that authorities reject the deals. This implies a certain level of FDI share, beyond which success rate of cross-border acquisitions will decrease.
Following this logic, we propose:
Hypothesis 4: Given the effects from both FDI policy and national security, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between FDI share and the likelihood that a cross-border acquisition attempts is completed.
Technology policy. Chinese economic nationalism advocates the enhancement of the national economy by introducing modern production and management practices and skills into China that local firms can learn and benefit from in light of liberalism (Deng, 1978) . Capital and external knowledge can be acquired through developing key business relationships (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; Yli-Renko, Autio & Sapienza 2001) . Cross-border acquisition is one channel to establish business relation with foreign firms. Although FDI policy and other FDI related industrial policies have been amended several times 13 in the past, encouraging technology transmission via FDI remains a focus of these policies, and it is much more so in recent years in consistence with the fundamental objectives of attracting FDI.
Moreover, China has been changing its growth strategy from an export-and investment-driven economy to a consumption-and quality-driven one to achieve long-term sustainable national prosperity. To meet this end, the government advocates the industrial upgrading by promoting the development of high-tech industries. FDI is considered as an important instrument to pursue this goal, and consequently is encouraged to flow into the high-tech sectors under the dominant liberalism.
Therefore, we expect that:
Hypothesis 5: An acquisition in high-tech industry is more likely to be completed than a deal in other industries.
Industrial Policy. Another measurement to enhance the national economy relates to the need of capital for development. One of the key purposes of attracting FDI is to fill the capital gap typical for an emerging economy like China as suggested in the 'two-gap' model (Chenery & Strout, 1966; McKinnon, 1966; Wang, 2007; Weisskopf 1972) , and the mobilization of domestic savings and foreign capital are needed to generate sufficient investment to accelerate the process of national development.
Inward acquisition could be a quick way for the host country to raise the capital it needs as advocated by the liberalists. Therefore, we expect that:
Hypothesis 6: An acquisition in a capital demanding industry is more likely to be completed than a deal in other industries.
Foreign investors is often expected to provide to a host country a commercially viable package consisting of superior process and product technology supported by appropriate organizational and managerial capacities (Henley & Kirkpatrick, 1999) . The host country can benefit from FDI via improving efficiency in some traditional industries as liberalism would suggest. Selling inefficient firms to foreign investors could be one solution to avoid job loss and increase social instability.
Following this nationalistic goal, FDI is not only allowed but encouraged to participate in the restructuring of those ailing firms. Therefore, we expect that: The detailed sources for each variable can be found in Table 1 .
Dependent variable
Acquisition completion is operationalized as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the announced acquisition attempt is completed and 0 otherwise.
Key explanatory variables
In line with our hypotheses, we choose a set of explanatory variables capturing economic nationalism factors. Security indicates whether a target is in the industries that are national security-related according to the SASAC, including war industry, power grid and power, petrochemical, telecommunications, coal, civil aviation, and shipping (Xinhuan News, 2006) . We code it as 1 if it falls into these categories and 0 otherwise. High tech indicates whether a target is in high-tech industry (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). We use AeA's 45 SIC codes list 8 , measured at the four-digit level, to identify these industries.
SOE target and
Capital denotes the demandingness of capital in an industry. A high Capital indicates the industry demands more capital. It is measured by the total capital invested in an industry divided by the number of firm in the industry.
Loss share indicates the percentage of companies in loss in an industry. It is calculated by the number of money-losing firms divided by the total number of companies in that industry.
Control variable
We included a number of control variables that may be linked to acquisition completion. Sought percentage is the percentage of ownership stake of a target sought by the acquirer in a transaction. The higher this factor is, the more likely it is at stake for the acquirer's and target's shareholders, which may affect both sides' approval (Dikova, Sahib & Witteloostuijn, 2010) and make it more difficult to complete. When there is a high sought percentage, the transaction becomes more sensitive to interest groups, including stakeholders of the target and the acquirer, and even the competitors and Investment risk is an assessment of factors affecting the risk of investment, ranging from 0 to 12. The risk rating is the sum of three components (Contract Viability/Expropriation, Profits Repatriation, and Payment Delays), each ranging from 0 to 4. A score of 12 equates to Very Low Risk, and 0 refers to Very High Risk (PRS Group, 2007) . We expect that when the investment risk increases, the deal completion becomes harder to achieve.
Finally we develop three dummy variables, HK, US and Japan, to control for the country/region specific effect by these three areas and Europe 9 (treated as a reference group in the models). We do this for two reasons. First, these four economies are different from each other and from other economies in terms of culture, economy and politics, hence the investment behaviors and strategies of firms from these economies are different (e.g. Park & Lee, 2003) . Second, they are homes of major acquiring investors in China, which account for 71% of total cross-border acquisitions in China.
(INSERT 
where P ( i ) is the probability of acquisition i being completed; e is the exponential function; X ( i ) is the vector of independent variables, including the key explanatory variables and control variables listed above; and β is the regression coefficients for the vector of independent variables X ( i ). The explanatory power of the logit model is determined using the likelihood ratio test. legislation's goals is to maintain "national economic security". It brings all cross-border acquisitions to the review procedure. Exemption from such review can only be granted when the transaction: 1) "can improve the conditions for fair competition in the market"; 2) "can restructure a loss-making enterprise and safeguard employment"; 3) "introduces advanced technology and management personnel and enhances the international competitiveness of the enterprise"; or 4) "can improve the environment".
10 By comparing the differences before and after the enforcement of the legislation, we will be able to tell if the institutions influence cross-border acquisitions in China. We report the coefficients, standard error, value of the likelihood function at convergence and the likelihood-ratio chi-square in each model. The chi-square statistic is significant at 1% level in all models, which suggests that the models with explanatory variables and control variables fit better than a model only with the constant.
RESULTS
(INSERT TABLE 2 and 3 ABOUT HERE)
Security has significantly negative influence on acquisition success in Models 1-6, supporting H 1.
The insignificance of its effect in Model 7-9 can be explained by including the industry-level data. As mentioned above, the industrial data only cover the manufacturing sectors with SIC codes of 20-38.
All industries considered being of economic security, excluding petrochemical, are not included, leaving only 5% of deals related to national security included in the estimations. With 95% of deals in the seven industries excluded, the estimations could be biased because of the unrepresentative data.
19 Therefore, the insignificance in these three models should not weaken the explanatory power of Security. SOE target is negatively and significantly linked to acquisition success in all relevant models (Models 2 and 4), providing support to H 2a, suggesting that a deal with a SOE target faces more stringent constraints. SOE target becomes insignificant when we include Private target in Model 4a
with the reference group as those targets that are neither SOEs nor private firms. A possible reason could be that part of these targets in reference group are not completely free from government intervention, especially target firms with share, even though minority, owned by the government.
Another reason can be that some targets have parent(s) or shareholders whose interferences complicate and deter the acquisition process. These complexities require further study. Private target is positively related to acquisition success (p<0.01), supportive to H 2b, suggesting a deal with a private target faces less obstacles than a deal with other target.
Foreign relation has a positive effect (p<0.1) on acquisition success in all models, in support to H 3. In line with our expectation, the control variable sought percentage is negatively and significantly related to acquisition success in Model 1, 3, 5, and 8. Not surprisingly, investment risk is significantly positively associated with acquisition success in all models, indicating the importance of investment environment for a successful acquisition. Strikingly, HK has a significantly negative coefficient in Model 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 9, indicating that acquisitions by Hong Kong investors tend to be unsuccessful.
This certainly has implications for future research. US and Japan also have significantly negative impact on acquisition success in Model 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6, implying that acquirers from US and Japan face more obstacles than those from other areas such as Europe.
The results of the estimation with domestic acquisition are presented in Table 4 . The coefficient of 20 Security is negative and significant, and the coefficient of Private target is positive and significant, in line with the result in cross-border acquisition case. The coefficient of SOE target is positive and significant, which is opposite to the estimation with cross-border acquisition case in Table 3 . The interaction term Security*SOE has positive and significant coefficient, and the coefficient of Security*Private acquirer is insignificant, revealing that Chinese SOE acquirers are more likely to be successful in conducting acquisition in security-related industries.
(INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE)
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER ANALYSIS
Our empirical analysis above provides evidence that economic nationalism influences cross-border acquisition completion in China at least through three channels: national security consideration, foreign relations with home countries, and national growth strategy. In this section, we provide further analysis and finding from dynamic and ownership perspectives, and discussion on generalizability of the findings.
Changes over time
In the past 30 years, China has strived to rebuild its nation from the past ruin; the rise of economic nationalism is evident in both the country's ruling party's discourse and economic policies. The recurring themes are centered on nationalistic values such as national unity, identity, autonomy, prestige, and prosperity of the nation as reflected by the dynamic interaction of protectionism and liberalism. In our empirical study, we observe the changes of China's attitude to FDI into high-tech industries, the appetite for foreign capital and industrial performance. Table 3 In addition, the confirmed inverted U-shape relationship between FDI share and success rate of inward acquisitions also shows the attitude toward FDI could change over time given the dynamic interplay of liberalism and protectionism due to the fear of dominant foreign ownership in industries.
Attitude to foreign investment into high-tech industries. As reported in
To what extent the obstacles can be attributed to economic nationalism
One may argue that domestic firms, particular private owned, may also face obstacle in acquiring another domestic firm that is national security-related. Therefore, we need to be clear to what extent the obstacles underpinned by nationalism are specific to foreign acquirers. The estimation results from Table 4 answer this question. Second, security industry is significantly and negatively linked to acquisition completion, implying that acquiring a firm in an industry related to national security is more protected and thus more difficult than that in other industries for local players, comparable to their foreign counterparts.
Moreover, we find that the completions are different between domestic SOEs and private firms by testing the moderate effect of ownership on security industry. The results indicate that, when private 15 Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China.
acquirer does not work as a moderator, SOE acquirer has a significant and positive moderating effect on security industry, implying that state ownership make a successful acquisition in security industries easier. By comparing both cross-border and domestic acquisitions, we conclude that both foreign and domestic acquirers except SOEs face a high fence in completing M&A in security related industries.
Therefore, economic nationalism again plays a role in acquisitions in security industries.
The generalizability of the findings
The uniqueness of nations' formal institutions and the complex nature of China's transitional economy and political considerations may limit the generalizability of our empirical findings. However, economic nationalism is prevalent across the world, and seeking to attract FDI is not so much a China-specific phenomenon. Our research still provides applicable and helpful insights to other contexts. First, security concern in relation to FDI is widely perceived in both developing and developed countries; China is just one among around 90 countries that apply regulatory scrutiny procedure to cross-border M&A (Singh, 2002) . The regulatory scrutiny gives special attention to industries that are related to national security. For example, US governments requires transactions involving regulated industries (e.g. energy, public utilities, gaming, insurance, telecommunications and media, financial institutions and defense contracting) should prepare for extra layer of approvals by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) (Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz , 2008) . Second, SOEs exist in nearly all countries despite their different social nature. SOEs are often prevalent in utilities and infrastructure industries whose performance is of great importance to broad segments of the population and to other parts of the business sectors (OECD, 2005) . Therefore the resistant force against M&A of SOE targets may be prevalent everywhere. Third, diplomatic activities are wildly used as a tool to enhance economic exchange (Lee & Hudson, 2004) . Most of countries use business diplomacy as one of the main elements of diplomatic policies. Governments allocate diplomatic resources to make business activities more concentrated, hence to extend the diplomatic business scope (Lee & Hudson, 2004) . Governments are likely to become business cooperators. In this case, our finding about foreign relations' effects can be interpreted in a more generalized sense. Fourth, many developing countries apply similar development-oriented FDI policies to pursue their own national objectives (UNCTAD, 2003) , where conditions for foreign firms 24 are comparable to those in China. Fifth, developed countries also endeavor to attract FDI to underpin economic growth and employment. Currently, two reasons make economic nationalism become more important in these countries. The first one is current global crisis; the other is the rising of FDI from developing/transition countries. While not all the empirical findings of this study are applicable to the developed countries, the concept model is relevant due to the fact that the nationalizing mechanism applies in both developing and developed countries (Pickel, 2002) .
CONCLUSION
This paper focuses on an overlooked but important relationship in IB literature that economic nationalism may influence the success of an announced cross-border acquisition. We suggest that economic nationalism may be associated with both protectionism that discourages foreign investment, and liberalism that encourages the foreign investment. Economic nationalism, developed and adjusted according to a nation's internal and external conditions when forming part of the national ideology, shapes and influences the national policies toward global market participation. When a foreign investment is perceived to threaten the economic security, protecting nationalism arises. When foreign investments benefit to host's economic development, liberal nationalism gains ground. The findings of the study help us understand, from a perspective of economic nationalism, why cross-border acquisitions differ from their domestic counterparts in completion, why some cross-border acquisitions are more difficult to complete than others, how targets' and their industrial attributes influence the cross-border acquisition success, and how the effects of relevant regulations/policies change over time as they evolve.
This paper focuses on three economic nationalism elements, including national security concerns, foreign relations, and economic growth policy (i.e., industrial policy, technology policy, and FDI policy). China as the context, our findings show that, when an acquisition activity targets essential industries or a SOE, the nationalism becomes more of protectionism, and the acquisition is less likely to complete. When an acquirer is perceived to bring desired technology and/or capital (stipulated by China's national regulations and policies), or expected to help restructure poorly performing firms, or the acquirer is from a country with good foreign relation with China, the acquisition will be considered as safe and helpful, and the acquisition is easier to complete. In addition, some effects may change 25 over time due to the changes of the economic and political situations and thus policies.
Our theoretical approach and empirical results contribute to the literature in three major ways. First, our research offers new insights to IB literature by examining economic nationalism as one of the main institutional aspects encountered by MNEs in M&A. It adds to OLI model by exploring the degree to which economic nationalism impacts M&A success when the FDI location is chosen. It confirms OLI's claim that economic nationalism is an influential factor among other national characteristics when MNEs consider the international presence for markets, national resources, ways to increase efficiency and strategic assets (Dunning, 1998) . Furthermore, it provides a new and superior perspective over simplified dichotomy of protectionism and liberalism on exploring the mechanisms how a host country's institutions impact the likelihood to complete an inbound cross-border acquisition over the past.
Second, our study enriches the development of a dynamic view of institution theory by investigating the evolving effects of nationalism on inward acquisition completion in China. In this sense, our analysis of the changing impacts of institutional factors extends institution theory, which focuses overly on static outcomes of institutions but neglects the dynamic mechanism.
Third, the analysis of Chinese economic nationalism can be generalized to other developing countries, since many developing countries apply the similar development-oriented FDI policies to pursue their own national objectives (UNCTAD, 2003) . Developed countries also endeavor to attract more investment via policy and promotional efforts. Nationalism concern rises in particular to the increasing FDI from transition economies, where our conceptual model may be applicable.
Our findings provide some important managerial implications. Our study advances the traditional wisdom to provide measured effects of nationalism on international acquisition completion, and thus brings the awareness of the functioning economic nationalism to those MNEs that want to play in international arena. Our analysis shows that Chinese economic nationalism is a dynamic phenomenon, and its influence evolves over time given China's transitional nature. In order to achieve economic development, China is on its way to be integrated into the world economy, and welcomes foreign investment. However, China's protectionist policies remain powerfully applicable if necessary. Thus both liberalist and protectionist approaches work depending on the specific conditions of inbound 26 acquisitions. Accordingly although economic nationalism sometimes shows anti-foreign-acquisition sentiments, it does not always cause problems for foreign MNEs that intend to acquire domestic firms.
When a cross-border acquisition fits the national growth strategy, economic nationalism shows positive impact on the activity. Therefore, being aware of the local nationalist attitudes and actions, understanding foreign relations between the China and their home country, and recognizing the host's growth strategy/policies, are extremely important for successfully conducting cross-border acquisitions in China.
Managers for international M&A are also advised to consider several tactical factors when acquiring in China. First, under current Chinese FDI policy, foreign investors may be better off to avoid the seven sensitive industries, including war industry, power grid and power, petrochemical, telecommunications, coal, civil aviation, and shipping as classified by SASAC, and Chinese SOEs. Second, a low profile attitude is recommendable for investors from a China-unfriendly home country such as USA and Japan. Third, targeting high-tech industries, and poorly performing companies, and shunning from foreign capital intensive sectors are also strategies to have successful M&A in China. There are more strategic considerations, for example to build the corporate image better, and adapt corporate structure and capability to cater for the changing needs of hosts (Wright & Ricks, 1994) .
Admittedly, economic nationalism is an under-researched area. More research efforts need to be put into investigating the nationalism -business relationship. First, though the conceptual model might be generalizable, the empirical tests of the study are based on the case of China. Researchers may be interested to explore the applicability of our empirical findings to other contexts including developing and developed economies. Second, we did not fully explore the rational link between the economic nationalist ideology and economic actions and the direct link between the ideology and cross-border acquisition. These links are important to understand the effects of economic nationalism, because those aspects of economic nationalism reflecting informal institutions (e.g. national sentiments) may also influence the outcomes of cross-border acquisitions. Third, MNEs' entry strategy and acquisitions are not random. So they may be a self-selected method and there are other factors such as firm attributes and industrial conditions affecting the completion than merely the acquisition itself. Further research needs to address the self-selection issue. 
